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The presence of armed illegal non-state actors in the DRC continues to pose a security challenge not only to Uganda but also to the entire region. The study analyzes several of the militias that have established bases in the DRC. The militias to have dispersed to distant locations that make it hard for the military to counter them. The resulting insecurity has forced some communities to acquire arms for self-defense, which drives insurgency. Cross border, attacks have dragged the affected neighboring countries to intervene in the DRC. The DRC must build capacity to defeat the militias with the help of the regional partners, the international community, the restructured UN intervention force and the US in support and enabling roles. African Economies at The University of Oxford, a country with a dispersed population has a 50% risk to face conflict because it is harder for the government to control its territory. 3 Steven Metz, 4 a Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, notes that insurgencies have organic life cycle with founding fathers. 5 Whereas some insurgencies die in their infancy, others thrive due insurgency raw materials, which is a combination of motivation, desperation and opportunity. 6 Motivation occurs when a group defines its social identity not shared by a dominant group and adopts insurgency to force the state 2 to change its policies. 7 Desperation is history specific -repetition of certain events.
Opportunity manifests when the state is unwilling or unable to deal with either the motivation or desperation. 8 Greenwood and Hammes define ill-structured problems as interactively complex, where experts honestly disagree on the definitions and solutions, but seek to determine what is good enough. 9 Lastly, the formulation of an ill-structured problem and conceiving the solution are identical and simultaneous cognitive processes.
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The paper starts by analyzing some of the militias and their role in shaping relations between the affected countries and then evaluates the current intervention strategies to disarm the militias in the DRC. It concludes by noting that using the militaries from the affected countries with the US, regional organizations, the UN, and the EU in support and enabling roles, would pacify the DRC for a defined period. "approximately 3,000-4,000 combatants." 18 In 1994, about two million Hutus also fled into the DRC as refugees. 19 Such a population that lives near its country of origin has a potential to keep a conflict active. First, it provides an opportunity to the FDLR to build a network to coordinate its activities; secondly, it will provide the youth for enlistment. The argument is that such UN relief activities that do not encourage repatriation or emigration of refugees will create a "Hutu refugee nation" 20 that will constantly replenish the FDLR. The UN can avert this by implementing policies that support voluntary repatriation or relocation of these refugees deeper into the Congo.
Mai Mai, which means "self-defense" in local east DRC languages, is a collection of several militia groups operating in North and South Kivu provinces. internally displaced and forced 163,000 refugees to flee into Uganda. 38 It also forced a battalion of the FARDC to "tactically withdrawal to Uganda." 39 
The mutinies, desertions and defections, a service commander who arms militia groups, 40 serious abuses, killings of innocent civilians, and raping of women 41 by the national army, degrades successful counterinsurgency operations. It is apparent that such lapses in FARDC's discipline may be due to the criteria used in the enlistment of personnel into the national army. The DRC has enlisted most of its soldiers through integration of various militias with different political ideologies. Whereas that is prudent to achieve unity of command, lack of an operational code of conduct and the enforcement of high standards is what compromises discipline.
Certainly, the DRC is a huge country that will require a strong, disciplined force to deny militias ground, protect its people and safeguard its borders. A strong army is required "to establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development. Clearly stated, one of the MONUSCO objectives is to protect civilians and deter any illegal violent group in eastern DRC. 47 However, when the M23 rebels occupied Goma in November 20, 2012, MONUSCO did not attempt to block them. The reason the MONUSCO commander gave was that "once the FARDC had withdrawn, 48 they could do nothing to stop its advance. It will be hard for anyone to understand why MONUSCO accepted to coexist with an illegal violent group for ten days. The mandate is very clear, to engage by fire only in self-defense, or to protect civilians and the FARDC. There is nowhere the mandate authorizes MONUSCO to coexist with an illegal, armed non-government actor. There are some concerns. First, the UN mandate sets ambiguous objectives for MONUSCO to accomplish in the Congo. Second, the composition of MONUSCO strategy employs the Indians, Pakistanis, Nepalese, Bangladeshis, and North Africans who despite being experienced peacekeepers are culturally misaligned. Lack of basic cultural and ethnic nuances, which are possible drivers of a conflict in the Congo, will affect the decisions they make. Third, the rigor, courage and commitment such a force has cannot match that of locally tailored force that is drawn from the affected countries. Fourth, MONUC has in the past also been involved in cases of sexual abuses. 49 All these coupled with the current worsening of the humanitarian situation in eastern DRC as the number of the "internally displaced increases to 1,000,000 people," 50 makes MONUSCO lose its credibility. 51 One can argue that failure to protect civilians, enables them acquire arms for culture of selfdefense, which leads to their misuse for selfish ends, which breeds insecurity.
In any peacekeeping operations, protection of civilians should be the first priority.
With an estimated annual expenditure standing at $1.4 billion 52 as of 2012, MONUSCO is the biggest and the most expensive UN peacekeeping mission in the world. One can argue that the UN intervention strategy in the DRC is not feasible, neither acceptable nor suitable. Ingrid Samset a Norwegian researcher on African Great Lakes clearly notes that such failures result from three levels of institutional realities, the nature of MONUC, the UN system and the Congolese state. 53 
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The US Strategy
Advancing peace and security forms one of the objectives of the US strategy towards Sub Saharan Africa. 54 This is reinforced by the Presidential Study Directive 10 (PSD -10), which defines the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide as a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the US. 55 Guided by the above, the US has formulated the LRA Disarmament and North Uganda Recovery strategy with four core objectives, namely, to 1) increase protection of civilians, 2) apprehend and to remove the LRA leaders from the battlefield, 3) encourage defection and to support demobilization and reintegration of the LRA combatants, and 4) provide humanitarian assistance to the affected communities. 56 Implementing the strategy requires building consensus between the US, the UN, and the AU involvement. The AU has authorized the formation of a multinational force composed of militaries from Uganda, the DRC, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. The US is only performing the supporting and enabling functions that include logistical support, and strategic lift of troops, the provision of intelligence, coordination, political access, provision of communication equipment, and training using a team of Special Forces, who are not involved in combat except to provide "the right balance of strategic and tactical experience." 57 The strategy also involves that use of all elements of statecraft.
As such, the US Department of State Rewards Program Update and Technical
Corrections Act, has placed an offer for information leading to the arrest of the LRA leaders including Kony. 58 To implement this strategy, the US spends US$ 30 million per year. three leaders order is a case in point. 64 ICGLR has also proposed the deployment of a neutral force as a way to boost the UN intervention.
At a critical moment when regional leaders were starting to discuss DRC security problems, the UN Group of Experts (GoE) leaked a report alleging that Uganda and Rwanda were providing military support 65 to the M23 rebels. Whereas, it did not affect the confidence the leaders had in solving the problem, it may have undermined their trust, though the leaders were aware that the ICGLR Secretary General had contacted Uganda president Museveni in his capacity as the Chairperson of the ICGLR to find a solution. 66 The argument is even if the GoE's had substantial evidence, the method it used and timing was not appropriate to enhance trust that was critical to providing the needed stability in the region. It is hard to establish the motives of the GoE. Whether it is rivalry or competition the goal of the UN and ICGLR is peace and stability in the region. It is prudent for GoE to synchronize their operations in the region.
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The Suggested Solutions To achieve stability, the DRC must defeat all militia groups through disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation all combatants to their countries of origin.
It is not as easy as it sounds. It will require a separate strategy for each militia group while mitigating the consequences it may cause. The assumptions held are that some of the militias are likely to opt for peaceful resolution to the conflict, while others will require forceful disarmament. The possible approaches to the problem are, to: 1) restructure MONUSCO with a neutral force to disarm the militias forcefully. However, DRC must mitigate possible spills of the militias to other peaceful areas with the US, EU partners and regional neighbors in enabling and supporting roles. 2) Create a regional force based on the US anti-LRA model probably with two regional task forces (RTF), the first composed of MONUSCO, the DRC and Rwanda to disarm the FDLR and second RFT composed of MONUSCO, the DRC and Uganda to disarm the ADF, whose implementation must be phased.
All the above are possible options to stabilize the DRC. However, involving Rwanda and Uganda in the operations to hunt down their respective militias will accelerate the disarmament of the militias in the DRC to set conditions for other lines of national instruments of power to consolidate peace and stability in the DRC.
Security Impacts
Regional instability is one of the greatest threats to the national security interest of Uganda. 67 In the past, insurgency has slowed the economic growth, led to loss of Congolese refugees and 35,000 Ugandans has only one health center. 69 
Conclusion and Recommendations
The militias will continue to be a threat not only to Uganda but also to the entire region unless the international community changes its approach to the militias in the DRC. In the past, the LRA and ADF committed serious crimes and atrocities against Ugandans forcing 2.5 million people to leave in IDP camps in northern and western Uganda. Uganda lost US$ 2.5 bn to the LRA insurgency in the North. However, having defeated all the militias and resettled the people, instability in the DRC poses one of the greatest National security concerns to Uganda.
In the DRC, the population is geographically dispersed, which makes it objectively harder for the government to control. As a result, some Congolese minorities like the Banyamulenge, the Hutus, and the Mai Mai communities in the two Kivu provinces have adopted insurgency as a means to force the government to respond to 18 their grievances -grant them citizenship and security. The repetitive cycle of insurgency, which always starts from Goma has continued to threaten Kinshasa.
The militias have taken advantage of the ungoverned space to establish their base in locations that make it harder for the FARDC to counter them. However, internal conflicts, poor civil -Military relations and socio-military conflicts such as mutinies, desertions and misconduct against its citizens, degrade the national army's capacity to counter successfully the insurgents. The DRC must develop the human dimension of its military and create a robust military justice system to end impunity.
The study shows that MONUSCO lacks a clearly defined strategy for the Congo. The US anti -LRA strategy has clearly defined objectives, employs regional militaries, and enables parties to cooperate with both the UN and AU. The US provides the enablers such as intelligence, coordination, training and logistical support. A comparison of the two strategies by measure of success and cost, indicate that the US anti-LRA strategy is achieving its intended objectives.
The militias in the two Kivu provinces will certainly require a comprehensive strategy that blends carrots and sticks. The success in the pacification of the DRC will depend on cooperation between the Congolese and regional leaders, the US, the international community, and international organizations such as the UN, AU, ICGLR, and the ICC. This paper comes out with two possible policy options to deal with rebels
